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Bank Loan Supply and Monetary Policy Transmission in Germany: 





This paper addresses the credit channel in Germany by using aggregate data. We present a 
stylized model of the banking firm in which banks decide on their loan supply in the light of 
expectations about the future course of monetary policy. Applying a VAR model, we estimate 
the response of bank loans to a monetary policy shock taking into account the reaction of the 
output level and the loan rate. We estimate our model to evaluate the response of bank loans 
by matching the theoretical impulse responses with the empirical impulse responses to a 
monetary policy shock. Evidence in support of the credit channel can be reported. 
 
JEL Classification: E44, E52. 





Ifo Institute for Economic Research 
 at the University of Munich 
Poschingerstr. 5 
81679 Munich, Germany 




University of Würzburg 
Department of Economics 
Sanderstr. 2 
97070 Würzburg, Germany 




Ifo Institute for Economic Research  
at the University of Munich and CESifo 
Poschingerstr. 5 
81679 Munich, Germany 






* We thank Gebhard Flaig, David Van Hoose and Charles Goodhart for valuable comments and 
suggestions. We are also grateful to the participants of the Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic 
Association and the Ninth Conference on MacroeconomicAnalysis and International Finance for 
fruitful discussions. The usual disclaimer applies.  1 Introduction
The credit channel assigns banks a pivotal role in the transmission of monetary
policy, which stems from the notion that ¯nancial markets are characterized by
imperfections.1 Banks are special in extending credit to borrowers { that cannot
access other types of credit { because of their expertise in mitigating ¯nancial
frictions. If banks adjust their loan supply following a change in the stance of
monetary policy, this has a bearing on real activity, since some borrowers have to
rearrange their expenditure decisions.2
As Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Hubbard (1995) point out, the credit
channel is working in addition to the interest rate channel, according to which
monetary policy a®ects the level of investment and consumer spending by inducing
changes in the cost of capital and yield on savings. Although, the credit channel
and the interest rate channel diverge in assessing the relevance of ¯nancial con-
siderations, they are deemed complementary, with the implication that monetary
policy can be e®ective through these transmission channels simultaneously.
Following Bernanke and Blinder (1992), a number of studies based on vec-
torautoregression (VAR) analysis have examined whether the credit channel is
operating alongside the interest rate channel by using aggregate data. Many
studies have shown that bank loans decline after a monetary policy shock, but
these ¯ndings are plagued by a severe identi¯cation problem, as it remains un-
clear whether the drop is driven by loan supply or loan demand e®ects. While
the credit channel emphasizes a shift in loan supply, the interest rate channel
stresses a shift in loan demand, which stems from a policy{induced decline in real
activity. Distinguishing between these predictions is a di±cult task, as "it is not
possible using reduced{form estimates based on aggregate data alone, to identify
whether bank balance sheet contractions are caused by shifts in loan supply or loan
demand" (Cecchetti, 1995, p. 92).
In light of this ambiguity, several studies have explored heterogeneity across
agents by moving from aggregate data to disaggregated data. For the U.S., Gertler
and Gilchrist (1993), Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (1995) and Oliner and Rudebusch
(1995) use panel data of a large number of business ¯rms. From this research it
appears that ¯rms of di®erent size encounter di®erent ¯nancial constraints after
a monetary tightening. Kashyap and Stein (2000) investigate panel data at the
1See Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Cecchetti (1995) or Hubbard (1995) for a survey of the
credit channel of monetary policy transmission.
2This idea centers on the assumption that some borrowers { in particular small and medium{
sized ¯rms { cannot issue corporate bonds at reconcilable terms because of information problems
or high costs associated with launching debt securities. Banks as ¯nancial intermediaries special-
ize in gathering and distilling information, which enables them to make loans to these borrowers
at more favorable terms.
2individual bank level. They observe that monetary policy particularly a®ects the
lending behavior of small banks with less liquid balance sheets. Kishan and Opiela
(2000) report a similar ¯nding by approximating bank lending activities on the
basis of bank size and bank capital.
So far, much work on the credit channel in Germany { implemented by Barran,
Coudert, and Mojon (1997), De Bondt (2000), Ehrmann (2004), Ehrmann and
Worms (2004), HoltemÄ oller (2003), HÄ ulsewig, Winker, and Worms (2004), Kakes
and Sturm (2002), Von Kalckreuth (2003) and Worms (2003) { has employed
aggregate and disaggregated data but reported contrary results. While some of
these studies ¯nd evidence in support of the credit channel, others conclude that
the credit channel is ine®ective. The vagueness in the results re°ects in part the
di±culty in separating the loan supply e®ects from the loan demand e®ects that
follow a monetary contraction.
This paper addresses the credit channel in Germany by using aggregate data.3
We present a stylized model of the banking ¯rm, which speci¯es the loan supply
decision of banks in the light of expectations about the future course of monetary
policy. Applying a VAR model, we estimate the response of bank loans to a
monetary policy shock taking account of the reaction of the output level and the
loan rate. We use our model as a guide to characterize the response of bank
loans { i.e. to decompose the adjustment of bank loans into the parts that can be
attributed to loan supply and loan demand { by matching the theoretical impulse
responses with the empirical impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. In
this vein, the identi¯cation problem inherent in approaches based on aggregate
data is explicitly addressed.4
Our ¯ndings suggest that the credit channel is operating alongside the interest
rate channel. Banks decrease their loan supply with an expected drop in their
credit margin after a monetary policy shock, while loan demand declines with
a drop in the output level and a rise in the loan rate. The decrease in loan
supply occurs instantly and bottoms out gradually. The decrease in loan demand
proceeds by degrees and continues more persistently.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our
model of the banking ¯rm, which establishes the basis for our testing. Section 3
sets out the empirical results, which are derived by adopting a two{step proce-
dure. First, we estimate a VAR model to generate impulse responses to a mone-
3Notice that in our analysis of the credit channel in Germany we disregard any distinction
between a bank lending channel and a balance sheet channel, which may coexist simultaneously.
Since in Germany banks provide the majority of external ¯nance to private households and ¯rms,
this suggests that the e®ects of monetary policy through these sub{channels coincide (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 2000).
4To our knowledge separating loan supply e®ects from loan demand e®ects by matching
impulse responses has not yet been proposed in the literature.
3tary policy shock. Second, we estimate our model by using a minimum distance
estimation, which matches the theoretical impulse responses with the empirical
impulse responses. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
2 A Model of the Banking Firm
Our analysis of the credit channel is based on a stylized model of the banking
¯rm, in which banks decide on their loan supply when future monetary policy
is uncertain. The model refers to Cosimano (1988) and Sargent (1979). Similar
approaches have been developed by Bo¯nger (2001), Elyasiani, Kopecky, and Van
Hoose (1995) and Mitusch and Nautz (2001).
2.1 Structure of the Model
Consider a banking system with many identical banks that act as price takers.
Banks grant loans to nonbanks (Lt), which they ¯nance with deposits (Dt) and
central bank credits (Bt) after subtracting required reserves (Rt). Each bank
takes the loan rate (rL
t ) and the deposit rate (rD
t ) as given. The central bank is
assumed to administer the policy rate (rM
t ) that determines the interest rate on
the interbank money market.5



















t+j = pro¯t at time t + j;
L
i










t+j = net position on the interbank money market
at time t + j at rate r
M
t+j;
Ct+j = costs of evaluating and adjusting the stock
of loans at time t + j:
Note that equation (1) is de¯ned for j = 0;1;2;:::.
Bank pro¯t matches the di®erence between the revenues and costs in the credit
business. Besides interest costs, the bank faces costs associated with adjusting
5Throughout the paper we presume that the central bank implements monetary policy by
means of an interest rate targeting procedure.







where (a) is a positive constant. The costs of adjusting the loan portfolio can
be thought of as re°ecting the allocation of resources necessary to evaluate the
creditworthiness of customers and to monitor loans during the duration. If the
bank realizes a change in the size of its loan portfolio, this requires to reshu²e
the amount of resources devoted to these activities.6 Assume the banking sector
comprises (n) banks with identical cost functions.








where (Et) is the rational expectation operator conditioned on the information
set (It) disposable at time t, and (¯) is a discount factor (0 < ¯ < 1). Let the
information set (It) include the past values of all variables and the present values
of all interest rates, i.e. Et(xt+j) ´ E(xt+jjIt).










where minimum reserves (Ri
t+j) are determined by: Ri
t+j = dDi
t+j, with (d) de-
noting the minimum reserve ratio (0 < d < 1). For a single bank the level of
deposits (Di
t+j) is assumed to be exogenously given (see e.g., Baltensperger, 1980;
Klein, 1971). Depending on stochastic °ows, the bank adjusts its net position
on the interbank money market (Bi
t+j) to meet the balance sheet constraint.7
The deposit rate (rD
t+j) is presumed to adjust to the interbank money market
rate (rM
t+j) in consideration of the minimum reserve ratio (d) due to arbitrage
conditions (Freixas and Rochet, 1997, p. 57).
2.2 Deriving Optimal Loan Supply
A single bank maximizes the expected present value of its pro¯t °ow by choosing
the optimal path of loans subject to the balance sheet constraint and conditional
on the set of available information.
6Notice that the costs of adjusting the loan portfolio are symmetric and thus do not depend
on whether the change in the loan volume is positive or negative.
7Hence, for a single bank (Bi
t+j) can either be positive or negative depending on whether
the bank borrows or lends on net on the interbank money market at the prevailing interbank
money market rate.














t+j+s); j = 0;1;2;:::; (5)
which raises with an expected increase in the loan rate and falls with an expected
increase in the policy rate. If the cost of adjustment parameter for loans (a)
increases, this requires a higher expected credit margin in order to maintain a
speci¯c level of lending.













t+j = 0; (6)
which shows that the optimal loan level is characterized by the equation of the
spread between the loan rate and the policy rate and the marginal costs of eval-
uating and adjusting the loan portfolio. The ¯rst{order condition is valid for
j = 0;1;2;:::; when j = 0, the variables refer to the presently observed and
expected values.
2.3 Loan Market Repercussions
Our model incorporates the assumption of a single and homogeneous loan market.
Aggregate loan supply of the banking sector satis¯es (here, evaluated for j = 0):










which is the sum of the supplies of the (n) identical banks that refer to the
currently observed and expected values.
Aggregate loan demand is assumed to be given by:
Lt = b1yt ¡ b2r
L
t ; (8)
where (yt) is the output level and (b1) and (b2) are positive parameters.9 The
demand for loans raises with an increase in the output level and falls with an
increase in the loan rate. The parameters (b1) and (b2) denote the income elasticity
and the interest elasticity of aggregate loan demand.
8The procedure used for deriving optimal loan supply is taken from Sargent (1979). See
Appendix A for details.
9Modeling loan demand in dependency of the output level and the loan rate is meanwhile
commonly accepted. See Calza, Gartner, and Sousa (2003), HÄ ulsewig, Winker, and Worms
(2004) or Kakes (2000) { among others { for empirical support.
6The equilibrium in the loan market is characterized by the equilibrium loan
level and the equilibrium loan rate.10 The equilibrium loan volume that maximizes
the banks' present value is (for j = 0):











where ¸1 and ¸2 are positive characteristic roots, with ¸1 < 1 < 1=¯ < ¸2, and
B1 = b1=b2. The equilibrium loan volume increases with an expected increase
in the output level and decreases with an expected increase in the policy rate.
Substituting the equilibrium loan level (9) into the loan demand equation (8)
yields the equilibrium loan rate:
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where B2 = 1=b2. The loan rate raises with an expected increase in the policy
rate and falls with an expected increase in the output level.11
2.4 Implications for Monetary Policy Transmission
Our stylized model implies that banks decide on their loan supply in the light
of expectations about the future course of monetary policy. Loan supply by
the banks declines with an expected fall in the credit margin after a monetary
tightening, but since the adjustment in the loan level is sluggish, the e®ects of
monetary disturbances are only passed on gradually. Since this suggests that
banks are not neutral conveyors of monetary policy { as predicted by the credit
channel { this is equivalent to the notion that bank behavior can play a meaningful
role in the propagation of monetary policy actions. We explore this prediction in
the following section by assessing impulse responses to a monetary policy shock.
3 Empirical Results
Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2004) and Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1998), we estimate our model to evaluate the adjustment of bank loans to
a monetary policy shock by using a two{step procedure. In the ¯rst step, we
estimate a VAR model to derive empirical impulse responses. In the second step,
10Since the credit channel does not imply credit rationing (see e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist,
1993, p. 46), we assume { for the sake of simplicity { that the loan market clears by price.
11This implies that the loan rate may follow a current change in the policy rate, but { owing
to adjustment costs { the adjustment is sticky if the change is perceived to be solely temporary.
7we estimate our model by matching the theoretical impulse responses with the
empirical impulse responses. The reaction of loan supply and loan demand to a
monetary policy shock is then determined on the basis of the estimated model
parameters.
3.1 Empirical Impulse Responses
As in Bernanke and Blinder (1992), we employ a VAR model of the form:
Zt = A(L)Zt¡1 + ¹ + "t; (11)
where Zt is a vector of endogenous variables, ¹ is a vector of constant terms and
"t is a vector of error terms that are assumed to be white noise. The variable





where GDP stands for real output, CPI for the price level, rM for the short{term
rate, which is controlled by the central bank, LOANS for real aggregate bank loans
and rL for the loan rate.12 Loan supply by the banks should depend on the credit
margin, i.e. the spread between rL and rM, while loan demand should depend on
real output and the loan rate. As the central banks aims at guaranteeing price
stability by setting the short{term rate, the price level is also included.
The VAR model is estimated in levels to allow for implicit cointegration re-
lationships between the variables. The sample period starts in 1991Q1, after the
German uni¯cation, and ends in 2003Q2.13 All variables are expressed in logs,
except the interest rates that are in decimals. The vector of constant terms com-
prises a constant and seasonal dummies. Choosing a lag length of three ensures
that the error terms are free of autocorrelation and conditional heteroscedastic-
ity.14
Based on the VAR model, we generate impulse responses of the variables
in Zt to a monetary policy shock, which is identi¯ed by imposing a triangular
orthogonalization. The ordering of the variables implies that an innovation in
the short{term rate a®ects the output level and the price level with a lag of one
quarter, while the loan volume and the loan rate are a®ected within the same
12See Appendix B for a description of the variables used in the analysis.
13The end of our sample period is determined by the switch to the new MFI interest rate
statistics of the European Central Bank (ECB), which entails a structural break in the data.
See Deutsche Bundesbank (2004) for details.
14The VAR is estimated with JMulti by LÄ utkepohl and KrÄ atzig (2004) as a SUBSET{VAR,
after running a restriction search routine on the basis of the Akaike information criterion in
order to achieve a parsimonious speci¯cation. See BrÄ uggemann and LÄ utkepohl (2001) { among
others { for a discussion about the advantages of SUBSET{VAR models.
8Figure 1: Empirical Impulse Responses
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Notes: Orthogonalized impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. The solid lines display
impulse responses. The dashed lines are 90% error bands computed from a bootstrap procedure
with 2000 replications. The horizontal axis is in quarters.
9quarter. Figure 1 displays the impulse responses of the variables to a monetary
policy shock, which is re°ected by a one{standard{deviation shock to the short{
term rate. The simulation horizon covers 16 quarters. The solid lines denote
impulse responses. The dotted lines are approximate 90% error bands that are
derived from a bootstrap routine with 2000 replications.15
Following a monetary policy shock, bank loans decline immediately. This
corroborates the results of De Bondt (2000), HoltemÄ oller (2003) and HÄ ulsewig,
Winker, and Worms (2004), who investigate the response of aggregate bank lend-
ing in Germany in a similar framework using monthly and quarterly data. The
drop in bank loans continues for around twelve quarters until it breaks o®. The
output level falls after three quarters, reaching a peak after around seven quar-
ters, and returns to baseline subsequently. The price level drops by degrees and
declines persistently. The loan rate and the short{term rate increase for about
four quarters and decrease afterwards. The loan rate follows a similar pattern as
the short-term rate, but generally remains on a lower level.
As Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Cecchetti (1995) point out, the decline in
bank loans after a monetary tightening is consistent with the credit channel, but
since the adjustment can be interpreted as being induced by loan supply and loan
demand, clear predictions are di±cult to establish. For an insight, we estimate
our model in an attempt to reveal the reaction of loan supply and loan demand by
adopting a minimum distance estimation, which matches the theoretical impulse
responses with the empirical impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. Before
we present the results, we brie°y discuss the methodology applied.
3.2 Methodology
The estimation of our model is based on the following state space representation:
A0Xt+1 = A1Xt + Àt+1; (12)
where Xt is the state vector, which is composed of a vector X1;t of backward{
looking variables and a vector X2;t of forward{looking variables, A0 and A1 are



























15For each variable the horizontal axis shows the number of quarters after the monetary policy
shock has been initialized. The vertical axis measures the response of the relevant variables. In
case of LOANS CPI and GDP a value of 0.001 corresponds to a 0.1 percent change of the baseline
value, while in case of the interest rates a value of 0.1 corresponds to a change of 10 basis points.
10r
L
t = B1yt ¡ B2Lt (14)
yt+1 = °1yt + °2(r
L
t ¡ 400(pt ¡ pt¡1)) (15)





t + (1 ¡ ±1)400±2(pt+1 ¡ pt) + ´t+1; (17)
where Ã ´ (¯ + na¡1B2 + 1), B1 = b1=b2 and B2 = 1=b2.
The ¯rst two equations specify the loan volume and the loan rate, which are
derived from our model.16 The output level is described by equation (15) as a
dynamic IS relation according to which real output is determined by the previous
level of real output and the real loan rate. Relating the output level to the real
loan rate attributes to the importance of credit conditions in the propagation
of monetary policy shocks. The price level is depicted by equation (16) as a
backward{looking Phillips curve that relates the price level to the output level.
Equation (17) illustrates the reaction function of the central bank that is described
by a simple Taylor{type policy rule in which the short{term rate is adjusted to
movements in the in°ation rate and the previous short{term rate.17 The monetary
policy shock is re°ected by the shock term ´t+1.
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16The identity of equation (9) and equation (13) is shown in Appendix A.2 (see equation
(A.8)).
17Notice that we have investigated di®erent types of policy rules in which the output level
was additionally included; though, preliminary estimations have shown that the level of output
turned out to be insigni¯cant.
11where A
4;1
1 = 400(1 ¡ ±1)®2±2 and A
4;2
1 = 400(®1 ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ±1)±2.
The closed loop dynamics of the model, which serves as a starting point to
generate impulse responses, are given by:
X1;t+1 = (A11 + A12C)X1;t + À1;t+1
X2;t = CX1;t; (18)
where A11 and A12 are sub{matrices of A = A
¡1
0 A1, which have been partitioned
conformably with X1;t and X2;t.18 Using the algorithms as described in SÄ oderlind
(1999), the matrix C is determined numerically.
For the matching of impulse responses, we estimate the set of parameters:
» ´ (b1;b2;na
¡1;±1;±2;°1;°2;®1;®2);
by minimizing a measure of distance between the theoretical impulse responses
and the empirical impulse responses. The discount factor is calibrated to: ¯ =
0:99. The optimal estimator of » minimizes the corresponding distance measure









^ ª ¡ ª(»)
´
; (19)
where ^ ª denote the empirical impulse responses, ª(») describe the mapping from
» to the theoretical impulse responses and V is the weighting matrix with the vari-
ances of ^ ª on the diagonal.19 The minimization of the distance implies that those
point estimates with a smaller standard deviation are given a higher priority.
3.3 Minimum Distance Estimation
In estimating our model we aim at evaluating the adjustment of bank loans to
a monetary policy shock. The impulse responses are shown in Figure 2 together
with the error bounds. The theoretical responses conform quite closely with the
empirical responses and fall generally { except for the primary reaction of the
output level and the price level { within the con¯dence interval.
Following a monetary policy shock, bank loans decline promptly and return
to baseline subsequently. The output level drops temporally. The price level
initially reacts sluggish, but declines persistently afterwards. The loan rate and













since A0 is block diagonal with an identity matrix as
its upper left block and the lower block of the shock vector is zero.
19If » is normally distributed, then J has a Â2{distribution with N ¡ m degrees of freedom,
where N is the number of observations on the impulse responses and m is the number of
coe±cients (see e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2002).
12Figure 2: Theoretical Impulse Responses
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Simulated loan rate
Estimated loan rate
Notes: The solid lines are empirical impulse responses and the solid lines with symbols are
theoretical impulse responses. The dashed lines are 90% error bounds. The horizontal axis is
in quarters.
13Table 1 summarizes the estimated set of parameters ^ » that minimize the dis-
tance measure. The parameter for the degree of stickiness na¡1 is 0.004. The
income elasticity b1 and the interest elasticity b2 are 2.16 and 0.016, which is in
line with other reported elasticities that range between 1.1{2.5 and 0.01{0.60 (see
e.g., Calza, Gartner and Sousa, 2003; Calza, Manrique and Sousa, 2003; HÄ ulsewig,
Winker and Worms, 2004; Kakes, 2000).20
Table 1: Parameter Estimates










Notes: The value function is 31.02 with a probability of 0.99. The probability is calculated
by using a Â2{distribution with 71 degrees of freedom. The standard errors are calculated
as the square root of the diagonal elements of the inverted Hessian matrix resulting from the
optimization of the value function.
In the reaction function of the central bank, the short{term rate reacts posi-
tively to movements in the in°ation rate. The output level is negatively related
to the real loan rate with an interest elasticity °2 of around ¡0:004. Finally,
the price level is positively attached to the output level, implying a slope of the
Phillips curve ®2 of roughly 0:11.
Our model implies that the adjustment of bank loans is determined jointly
by the response of loan supply and loan demand to a monetary policy shock.
Recall that loan supply depends on the previous loan level and the expected
20The divergence in the estimated elasticities of loan demand might result from using di®erent
types of loan aggregates, in particular di®erent categories and di®erent maturities, which implies
that it might be di±cult to ¯nd a robust benchmark within these ranges. According to Calza,
Gartner, and Sousa (2003), a possible explanation for an income elasticity above unity is that
GDP might capture the e®ect of omitted variables, such as wealth, which are also relevant to
explain loan demand.
14Figure 3: Decomposed Response of the Loan Volume
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(a) Loan supply components











(b) Loan demand components
Notes: The dashed lines display the simulated adjustment of bank loans after a monetary
policy shock. The solid lines display the simulated adjustment of the loan supply components
and the loan demand components that are calculated from the estimated and calibrated model
parameters. The horizontal axis is in quarters.
credit margin (see equation (7)):










while loan demand depends on the output level and the loan rate (see equation
(8)):
Lt = b1yt ¡ b2r
L
t :
Figure 3 displays the response of bank loans after a monetary contraction decom-
posed into the components that drive loan supply and loan demand, which are
calculated on the basis of the estimated and calibrated model parameters.21 The
reaction of bank loans corresponds to the cumulative response of the respective
loan supply and loan demand components.
The ¯ndings show that loan supply by the banks declines with an expected
fall in the credit margin after a monetary policy shock. The drop in the credit
margin occurs instantly and bottoms out gradually (see Figure 3, panel a). Loan
demand declines with the decrease in the output level and the increase in the
loan rate. The fall proceeds promptly despite the primary sluggish response of
21Since the simulation horizon only covers 16 quarters, we re{ran our simulation with T = 100
for the calculation of the expected credit margin in order to approximate the in¯nite time
horizon.
15the output level that is surpassed by the primary response of the loan rate (see
Figure 3, panel b).
Our results imply that the adjustment of bank loans is characterized by the
mutual drop in loan supply and loan demand following a monetary contraction.
The decrease in loan supply emerges instantly and fades gradually, while the
decrease in loan demand proceeds by degrees and continues more persistently.
In conclusion, our ¯ndings suggest that loan supply by the banks plays a
meaningful part in the transmission of monetary policy. This result may be
seen complementary to the approaches of Atanasova (2003) and Balke (2000),
which explore the asymmetric e®ects of monetary policy shocks for the U.S. in a
threshold VAR by using aggregate data. Their ¯ndings conform with the notion
that credit conditions are a major factor in shaping the consequences of monetary
policy.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has addressed the credit channel in Germany by using aggregate data.
We have developed a stylized model of the banking ¯rm in which banks decide on
their loan supply in the light of expectations about the future course of monetary
policy. We have estimated the response of bank loans to a monetary policy shock
taking account of the reaction of the output level and the loan rate. Using our
model as a guide, we have evaluated the response of bank loans { i.e. disclosing the
parts that can be attributed to loan supply and loan demand { by matching the
theoretical impulse responses with the empirical impulse responses to a monetary
policy shock.
Our ¯ndings suggest that the credit channel in Germany is working alongside
the interest rate channel, which is consistent with De Bondt (2000), HoltemÄ oller
(2003), HÄ ulsewig, Winker, and Worms (2004), Kakes and Sturm (2002) and
Worms (2003), who draw similar conclusions. Our results imply that loan supply
by the banks declines with an expected fall in the credit margin after a monetary
policy shock, while loan demand drops with a fall in the output level and a raise
in the loan rate. The decrease in loan supply occurs immediately and bottoms
out gradually. The decrease in loan demand proceeds by degrees and continues
more persistently.
16Appendix
A A Stylized Model of the Banking Firm
This appendix provides the steps used to derive a single bank's optimal loan
supply and the loan market equilibrium. De¯ne the lag operator by H such that
HXt = Xt¡1.
A.1 Optimal Loan Supply of a Single Bank


































for (j = 0;1;2;:::). Using the procedure established by Sargent (1979, pp. 197{












for (j = 0;1;2;:::).
The forward solution to equation (A.3) may be found by recognizing that







Et+jXt+j+i, if » > 1 and fxtg is bounded
(Sargent, 1979, p. 173). Here, » = 1=¯ > 1 and xt+j = (rL
t+j ¡ rM
t+j) is bounded,
if the transversality condition is satis¯ed.





T g = 0, where T denotes the terminal period. According to Sargent (1979,
pp. 197{200 and 335{336), the transversality condition holds if it is assumed




























17for (j = 0;1;2:::). Next, expand the information set from It+j to It+j+1 in (A.4),
which is the information the bank has when taking the decision on Lt+j+1, and















for (j = 0;1;2:::).
A.2 Loan Market Equilibrium
The loan market equilibrium is characterized by the equilibrium values of the loan
level and the loan rate.
The equilibrium loan level (9) can be derived by means of the following steps.
Multiplying equation (A.1) with n and setting j = 0 yields:






Next solve the demand for loans equation (8) for the loan rate:
r
L
t = B1yt ¡ B2Lt; (A.7)
where B1 = b1=b2 and B2 = 1=b2, and substitute rL
t into equation (A.6), to obtain:
¯EtLt+1 ¡ (¯ + na




















where Ã ´ (¯ +na¡1B2 +1). Now factor the left side of equation (A.9) using the











= (1 ¡ ¸1H)(1 ¡ ¸2H); (A.10)
where ¸1 and ¸2 are positive characteristic roots, with ¸1 < 1 < 1=¯ < ¸2.
Substituting expression (A.10) into (A.9) and applying the forward solution
as in (A.4) yields:











18Equation (A.11) can be rewritten by expanding the information set from It to
It+1, which gives:











after changing the index from t + 1 to t and recognizing that ¸1 = 1=(¯¸2).
The equilibrium loan rate (10) is found by inserting equation (A.12) into
equation (A.7) and rearranging terms.
B Data Base
The data is taken from the German Bundesbank (www.bundesbank.de) and the
German Federal Statistical O±ce (www.destatis.de).
1. GDP: Real German GDP in prices from 1995, seasonally unadjusted. German
Federal Statistical O±ce.
2. CPI: Consumer price index, seasonally unadjusted. German Bundesbank:
UUFA01.
3. LOANS: Loans to domestic ¯rms and private households (all banks), season-
ally unadjusted. German Bundesbank: PQA350; de°ated with the con-
sumer price index.
4. Loan rate rL: Average of the rate on mortgage loans and the rates of cur-
rent account loans. German Bundesbank: SU0001, SU0004 and SU0049.
Converted into quarterly data.
5. Short{term interest rate rM: Three{month money market rate, Frank-
furt/Main, monthly averages, German Bundesbank: SU0107. Converted
into quarterly data.
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